


SADAT'S STRATEGY

by PAUL EIDELBERG



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
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Visit of President Anwar Sadat to Israel, November 21-22, 1977: At working dinner with Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan.



I was in our village for the summer vacation when Hitler marched forth from Munich to Berlin, to wipe out the consequences of Germany's defeat in World War I and rebuild his country. I gathered my friends and told them we ought to follow Hitler's example...

Anwar el-Sadat

Autobiography (1978)(1)

Chapter 1: THE MODEL FOR CONQUEST

The preponderance of evidence indicates that Anwar el-Sadat, the President of Egypt, is engaged in a plan to destroy the state of Israel, and that he has patterned his method after the Nazi model of conquest. The model is a war-and-peace strategy synchronized to facilitate the eventual destruction of the enemy. It is suitable for use by dictators against democracies, that is, against regimes based on the primacy of public opinion—what Hitler called "the mightiest factor of our time." Sadat, who taught himself German while imprisoned by the British during World War II for his pro-Nazi activities, has studied Hitler's diplomatic tactics and methods of psychological warfare. He is applying them with cunning and effectiveness in his war against Israel.

The strategy has three interrelated objectives, the achievement of which depends very largely on the oratorical ability of the dictator to:

- 1) Shift the responsibility for war onto the enemy (while posing as the apostle of peace).
- 2) Divide and demoralize the enemy (by courting opposition party leaders and peace movements in the enemy's country).
- 3) Alienate the enemy from his friends or allies (by raising the spectre of war and economic catastrophe).

These three objectives may be pursued simultaneously by means of semantic subversion, and most effectively by using the language of democracy against democracy. For example, Hitler, a tyrant, appealed to

the democratic principle of self-determination to undermine Czechoslovakia's control of the Sudetenland without which the country could not defend itself. In the same way, Sadat, the head of a military dictatorship, constantly appeals to the principle of self-determination to undermine Israel's claim to the West Bank—really Judea and Samaria—without which Israel's heartland would be reduced to a 9 to 14 mile strip, rendering the country defenseless.*

It should be noted, however, that these appeals to self-determination are made doubly effective (and deceptive) by various threats of war. Thus, during the Nuremberg Rally of September 5-12, 1938—this was the month of Munich—Goering was assigned the role of saber-rattler. In his speech of September 10 he viciously attacked Czechoslovakia and left little doubt that Germany was prepared to go to war to solve the Sudeten German problem. Hitler's speech of September 12, though tough and insistent on Sudeten self-determination, was moderate by comparison. Today, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Goering's role is being played primarily by Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad. With militants like Assad helping him, Sadat can raise the spectre of war without appearing bellicose himself. It nonetheless remains clear that he holds the war option and will use it unless Israel accepts the principle of self-determination for Arabs on the West Bank. Given, therefore, the strong emotional appeal which this democratic principle has both in Israel and in the United States, Sadat's veiled threat to go to war on behalf of this principle has enabled him to achieve, to no small extent, each of the three objectives of the Nazi "peace strategy."

This strategy exploits not only the language but the media of democracy. It is not mere vanity that moves autocrats like Sadat to grant frequent interviews to American television and other news media. The media provide the most effective means of manipulating democratic public opinion by the systematic use of propaganda. Sadat, whose

*Note the double deception. Sadat's Egypt is no more based on self-determination than Hitler's Germany. And were the Arabs in Judea and Samaria to exercise self-determination, not only would they live under a form of government that denies the freedoms which make self-determination a continuously operating principle of political life, but that government would be committed to the destruction of Israel, the only country in the Middle East where such freedoms are enjoyed in all their fullness.

Here it should be noted that self-determination requires, among other things, freedom of speech and press, the equivalent of a multi-party system, and periodic elections whereby the people can change the men responsible for the formulation and execution of public policy.

What is sometimes called "national self-determination" is not necessarily consistent with self-determination as just defined. Dogmatic application of the former would permit every distinct ethnic, racial, and religious group to form a sovereign state, the consequence of which would be unmitigated anarchy. Consider, in this connection, the French in Quebec, the Protestants in Northern Ireland, the Scots, the Welsh, the Flemings in Belgium, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Laps in Sweden, and of course the American Indians to mention only a few Western examples.

ambition as a youth was to be an actor, is a master at dissembling. His mentor was Hitler, whose ability to deceive democracies needs no documentation. The text? *Mein Kampf*—required reading at Egypt's Military Academy. *Mein Kampf* serves a double purpose at the Egyptian war college. It reinforces Islamic hatred of Jews while teaching students fundamental principles of psychological warfare to be used against the Jewish state of Israel. Needless to say, the same principles can be (and are) used against Israel's ally, the United States.

Some of these principles are developed in *Mein Kampf's* chapter on "War Propaganda." Propaganda, writes Hitler, "must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses." "Its effect for the most part must be aimed at the emotions and only to a limited degree at the intellect." "The function of propaganda is... not to weigh and ponder the rights of different people, but exclusively to emphasize the one right which it has set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an objective study of the truth, in so far as it favours the enemy, and then set it before the masses with academic fairness; its task is to serve our own right, always and unflinchingly."² Therein is the source of the Big Lie.

The lie, to be big, must be manifestly false, so false as to arouse some doubt as to its falsity. To be effective, however, it must be repeated over and over again (with some variation) and in the form of slogans. To disarm democracies, the lie must be pleasing to democratic emotions and prejudices, such as the love of peace and the belief that peace is equally the aim of dictatorships. It was not Sadat but Hitler who coined the slogan "no more war."

The Big Lie can be made more effective if punctuated with candor. In fact, nothing is more deceptive than candor, as any accomplished dissembler knows. Take, for example, Sadat's admission in his "autobiography" of having urged his boyhood friends to follow Hitler's example. (Let us assume Sadat is telling the truth when he says he was twelve years old at the time.) Why this compromising confession, especially in a book published in America and aimed at an American audience?'

Sadat is certainly aware of the horror evoked by Hitler's name. He is also aware that his imprisonment for pro-Nazi activities in World War II is known to people who might seek to discredit him.⁴ Sadat is a voracious reader. He has studied and he understands the temperament of Americans. He knows how their very benevolence, which disposes them to "let bygones be bygones," renders them the more prone to disregard

and forget unpleasant facts about the past.* Accordingly, by admitting to having once had the ambition to follow Hitler's example, Sadat would very likely elicit something like the following response from most readers: "Surely he does not harbor such a dreadful ambition today, else he would not have been so candid or so incautious as to reveal it in his autobiography."

Consider, therefore, the following. In September 1953, several news agencies reported that Hitler was still alive. On the basis of this report, a Cairo weekly, *Al Musawwar*, asked a number of Egyptian personalities the following question: "If you wished to send Hitler a personal letter, what would you write to him?" One of those questioned was Colonel Anwar el-Sadat. Here is his answer:

My Dear Hitler,

I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart. Even if you appear to have been defeated, in reality you are the victor. You succeeded in creating dissensions between Churchill, the old man, and his allies, the Sons of Satan. Germany will win because her existence is necessary to preserve the world balance. Germany will be reborn in spite of the Western and Eastern powers. There will be no peace unless Germany once again becomes what she was. The West, as well as the East, will pay for her rehabilitation—whether they like it or not. Both sides will invest a great deal of money and effort in Germany, in order to have her on their side...

Substitute Islam for Germany and we behold, in this remarkable letter, the *Mein Kampf* of Anwar el-Sadat. Indeed, the letter to Hitler ends with these words: "We will not be surprised if you appear again in Germany or if a new Hitler rises in your wake."⁵

Two years later, in a speech celebrating the birthday of Muhammed, Sadat declared, with reference to the Jews: "The most splendid thing the Prophet Muhammed did was to drive them out of the whole Arabian peninsula.... They are a nation of liars and traitors, contrivers of plots, a

*Hasanain Haykal, former editor of Egypt's semi-official newspaper *Al Ahrām*, attributes this historical myopia to American pragmatism which he also ascribes to Israelis (who, by the way, welcomed Sadat in Jerusalem with open arms, the Yom Kippur War notwithstanding). See his *Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975), pp. 260-261, where he writes: "Israelis and Americans have always been at fault in approaching situations in what they believe to be a strictly pragmatic way. They have dealt only with what they could see,..concentrating on the present to the almost total exclusion of the past. How often in talks with Rogers, Kissinger, Sisco and others has Egypt heard the Americans say, in effect, 'We're not interested in raking over the past: let's look at the situation as it is today.' But today's situation," Haykal concludes, "is the creation of yesterday."

people born for the deeds of treachery I promise you ... we shall send them back to their former status ... as the Koran said of them 'condemned to humiliation and misery.' "6

SADAT'S "PEACE INITIATIVE": THE JERUSALEM SPEECH

One of the conditions laid down by Sadat for his visit to Jerusalem was that he be allowed to make a public speech from the Knesset, Israel's parliament. More than two thousand representatives of the mass media from scores of countries converged on the Holy City. The television coverage, like the event, was spectacular: a Moslem leader delivering what the democracies believed and desperately wanted to believe was a message of peace.

To understand the success of Sadat's Jerusalem visit, one must understand the character and consequences of his Knesset speech. As Churchill said of one of Hitler's deliverances: "What is astonishing is that it should have been regarded with anything but scorn by men and women of intelligence in any free country." Nevertheless, the impact of Sadat's speech was enormous.

For any public orator, the first task is to win the trust and confidence of his audience. For Sadat the difficulty was compounded by the diversity of his audience and the unprecedented character of his "peace initiative." It needs to be borne in mind, however, that Sadat's speech was designed to have maximum impact on public opinion in the United States, Israel's major ally and military supplier. Accordingly, in the first ten sentences of his speech Sadat employs the name of God ten times. "Surely a God-fearing man would not lie," or so most Americans, who know nothing about Islamic mentality, would tend to think. To reinforce this Western prejudice the words "frankness" and "sincerity" are used throughout the speech. Indeed, immediately before outlining the steps which he deems necessary for achieving peace, Sadat adjures his audience four times in three successive sentences with the phrase "let us be frank with each other."⁸ Nor is this all.

Anticipating, early in the speech, that some people might suspect him of a plot or conspiracy, Sadat reminds his audience: "As I have already declared, I have not consulted as far as this decision is concerned with any of my colleagues or brothers, the Arab heads of state or the confrontation states."^{*}

in reference to this claim, it is worth noting that Sadat made hurried trips to Damascus and Riyadh just before his visit to Jerusalem.

If, despite all these assurances, suspicion still lingered over his "peace initiative," Sadat met this problem by emphasizing that suspicion itself was at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and went so far as to blame Israel for this suspicion! "There was a wall between us which you tried to build up over a quarter of a century...It was a wall that warned us of extermination and annihilation if we tried to use our legitimate rights to liberate the occupied territories." (Note the Orwellian inversion of the party threatened with extermination and annihilation.) But "that wall fell and collapsed in 1973 [i.e., during the Yom Kippur War]. Yet, there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucination." And of course his visit is intended to tear down this wall, to "remove all suspicion of betrayal and bad intentions." Thus, with one bold stroke Sadat shifted the focus of suspicion from himself to Israel.

Here he was merely pursuing the first objective of the Nazi "peace offensive": to shift the responsibility for war onto the enemy. Despite the fact that Egypt precipitated five wars against Israel in twenty-five years, Sadat went on to denigrate the Jewish state by declaring: "I tell you, you .have to give up once and for all the dreams of conquest and give up the belief that force is the best method of dealing with Arabs."

In his Knesset speech and on countless other occasions, Sadat declared that the right of the "Palestinian people" to self-determination is the "crux of the entire problem," even of the entire Middle East problem (Hitler said that the rights of the Sudeten Germans to self-determination is the "core of the problem," of the entire European problem!). What we see here is the application of a simple idea to many problems of enormous complexity and gravity. "The receptivity of the great masses," writes Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, "is very limited, their intelligence small, but their power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence of these facts, all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and harp on these in slogans."⁹ Actually, the Arab-Israeli conflict is enormously complicated by issues of religion, social structure and the Arab attempt to reassert greatness as against the Western technological world. From a religious point of view, the mere existence of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel places in question Muhammed's prophecy and challenges the validity of the Islamic religion. Moslems take this seriously no matter what the rest of the world may think.¹⁰

Then there are profound political differences. Israel is a liberal democracy. Its social equality, its freedom of expression, its pluralism are viewed as a threat to the feudal social systems and autocratic power structures of the Islamic world. Despite Sadat's civilian garb, the regime in Cairo continues to rest upon the shoulders of the officer corps. The

military and security elite constitutes the domestic power base of the Egyptian leadership, as well as of its foreign policy plans and aspirations. In Egypt and elsewhere in the world of Islam, there are powerful vested interests which do not want to make peace with Israel.* The truth is that self-determination, far from being the crux of the problem, is irrelevant to the issue of peace in the Middle East. In fact, self-determination is a Sadat code word for war.

Consider more closely his slogan about the "Palestinian people" and their right to self-determination. Leaving aside the question of whether there is a "Palestinian people," there are more Palestinian Arabs living in Jordan (to say nothing of those living in other countries) than on the West Bank. The leaders of these Arabs fomented the 1970 civil war in Jordan and helped precipitate the genocidal war against the Christians in Lebanon. Secondly, if the Arabs on the West Bank were to exercise self-determination, sooner or later they would live under a military dictatorship, most likely that of the PLO. The aims of the PLO are set forth unambiguously in the 1977 Palestinian National Covenant (affirmed by every Arab nation including Egypt). The Covenant calls for the "liquidation" of Israel. Hence there is a sense in which Sadat tells the truth when he says "Palestinian" self-determination is the "crux of the entire problem." The solution to that problem on his terms would facilitate the "final solution" of the Jewish problem.

SADAT'S TACTICAL REVOLUTION

Suppose, however, that we were to ignore Sadat's admiration for Hitler or his application of the Nazi model of conquest to the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are two ways in which a cautious observer might analyze the significance of the Jerusalem peace initiative of November 1977.

- 1) Sadat is not only sincerely committed to peace, but is willing to make compromises consistent with Israel's long-range security.
- 2) Sadat wants "peace" but only as an alternative means to achieve the aim of war; that is, he came to Jerusalem seeking to facilitate, by duplicity, the piecemeal destruction of Israel.

"Major-General George Keegan, former head of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence, has said that a "profound change in Arab strategy is now underway... It is not understood in the U.S. I have seen intelligence which very few Americans have access to, that persuades me that the first element of that strategy is that the feudal leadership in the Arab world strikingly remain committed, Messianically, to the extermination of Israel as a nation and as a people. What has changed about that Messianic determination ... is the apparent Arab realization that after four futile wars, the direct [i.e., military] approach now appears to be one of such high risk that they are beginning to use the strategy of the indirect approach [namely, diplomatic duplicity]." (*Jerusalem Post Magazine*, August 5, 1977, p. 5 *et seq.*)

A prudent observer would have to admit that all the available evidence points to the second alternative. Sadat has made it clear to his "internal" audience, i.e., those who read Arabic, that he is engaged in what is for the Arabs a new strategy to win the traditional Arab goal of Israel's destruction. In a section of his memoirs published in *October* on September 11, 1977, two months before the peace initiative, Sadat wrote:

"Al Qaddafi has chosen to make the same terrible mistake that Arabs committed several years ago when they rejected everything and anything—when the Arabs turned the word 'no' into an idol which they worshipped, burned incense around, and in the process, burned all their bridges and were halted ... all this because the Arabs pinned the fate of the Arab nation and three of its generations to the word 'no.' In the field of politics, just as in the field of sports, the best player is not the one who kicks the ball out of the playground every time he gets it. This is escapism; he prefers to escape from the situation rather than take the ball, maneuver it through his opponents and then score a goal."¹¹

Notice Sadat makes no objection to Qaddafi's *goal*, repeatedly trumpeted as the annihilation of Israel, but to the *methods* by which the goal has been pursued. On the contrary, in the same passage Sadat goes on to say that he tries to avoid getting involved in minor and peripheral battles precisely because the coming war with the Jews should be the only thing that preoccupies him, and he is unwilling to become distracted "from this confrontation which will be much more violent than the October War."¹²

There were other hints shortly before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem that he was planning a new strategy. On September 3, 1977 Foreign Minister Fahmi (whose later resignation suggests that even he was not aware of the dramatic form the strategy would assume) argued against another Arab summit meeting.

"The world is opposed to Israel's actions in the territory—our main aim must be to exploit intelligently this international attitude. We must differentiate between the possible and the impossible; we must address the world in its own language and go with it as far as we can go... We must besiege Israel and isolate it internationally ... It is absolutely not in our interest to allow Israel to escape from this impasse. We could raise issues which we know, without even thinking about it, that the world atmosphere is not prepared for—issues which would provide Israel with new arguments to convince sections of world public opinion that throughout the history of the conflict the Arabs have thought only about the destruction and elimination of Israel ... Briefly it is not right...to allow Israel to escape the grip

of world society by raising ideas which would make the world forget Israeli extremism by pointing to what it might imagine to be Arab extremism ...We must not take steps unless we are sure they bring us closer to our goal.¹³

That the *goal* had not changed, merely the desirable method of achieving it, was emphasized by Sadat once again in September 1977, only weeks before his visit to Jerusalem.

"The October War was only the spark that set off the conflict—a conflict that is as old as the Arab nation. This conflict started when we fought against the Tatars, and later, the Crusaders, in defense of our rights, land and honor. Today we are fighting against Zionism in defense of our land and values ... Now after the October War we should never look back. In fact this struggle is not just a military conflict; it is a military, economic and political conflict. They are all links in the same chain. Therefore we must prepare ourselves for a prolonged conflict and all its relevant aspects."¹⁴

The next stage in that conflict, for Sadat, was the Jerusalem "peace initiative." In his Knesset speech he laid down the peace terms—unacceptable to both of Israel's major parties—from which he has never since deviated: that Israel return to the borders of 1949 and set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem). Upon returning home, he said in an interview for *October Magazine*, "We must take what we can get as a means for taking all that we want."¹⁵ Those who had followed Sadat's earlier remarks prior to his trip could scarcely be in doubt as to what he meant by "all that we want."

Without in any way abandoning his long range goal, Sadat was able to count major accomplishments from his trip to Jerusalem. Indeed Sadat has managed to win the world's accolades as a great peace-maker without once using the word "peace" on his trip. He used in his speech over and over again the word "salaam" which was translated as "peace" but which means nothing more than non-belligerence. *Salaam* was Sadat's code message to the Arab world that he would never make *Sulh*, that is, real peace, with Israel. Nonetheless Sadat was able to disarm and divide Israel and neutralize the United States—remarkable accomplishments indeed.

Recall how Sadat insisted on personal talks with the leaders of each of Israel's many political parties after his Knesset speech. His main target was Shimon Peres, leader of the opposition Labor Party. Sadat invited Peres to various meetings in Europe, the last in Salzburg under the auspices of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, whose hostile attitude

toward Israel is notorious. Sadat was thus able to negotiate with the Israeli opposition at the same time as with the Israeli government, coming to agreements with the opposition that put pressure upon the government to make still more concessions.

Hardly had Sadat returned to Egypt than various Israeli politicians, some even within the coalition, called upon the Begin government to "compensate" Sadat for his risk-taking in coming to Jerusalem. Sadat, of course, repeatedly referred to those risks in his Knesset speech. He thus made it easier for people in this Orwellian universe to regard the risks of one man as equivalent to, if not more important than, the security of a nation. Little did the world realize that the mere fact that Sadat was taking risks, be it of assassination or of a coup, is all the more reason why Israel should be very reluctant to take risks. No nation can afford to base its security on the longevity or political fortunes of a single man, even if his intentions were—as it seems clear Sadat's were not—unquestionably benevolent.

(Sadat came, he said, with a "message of security, safety, and peace to every man, woman, and child in Israel." He offered Israel, if it would but return to its pre-1967 borders, "all the guarantees you want"—hardly reassuring to those who recall Hitler saying "I am ready to give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia.")

Nevertheless, such were the domestic (and international) pressures that Israel came forth with the Begin Peace Plan. In response to Sadat's demand for self-determination and statehood for Arabs on the West Bank, the Begin Plan offered "autonomy" with the question of sovereignty to be taken up at the end of a five year period. In addition, the plan gratuitously acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, thereby surrendering the strategic port of Sharm el-Sheikh and compromising retention of the Sinai air bases, the backbone of Israel's defense forces. At the Camp David Summit, Israel of course agreed to relinquish control of the Sinai air bases.

But this was not enough for Anwar el-Sadat. He demanded "complete withdrawal" from all "occupied territories" including "Arab Jerusalem." "To speak frankly, our land does not yield to bargaining ...We cannot accept any attempt to take away...one inch of it nor can we accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it." Hitler put it this way in *Mein Kampf*: "There is no bargaining with Jews; there can only be the hard either-or."¹⁶

The Begin Peace Plan won only the grudging approval of a majority in the Knesset. Voices of criticism were heard within Begin's coalition: the plan gave too much away and endangered Israel's security. Even Labour thought the wholesale surrender of the Sinai was dangerous. The major difference, however, was over the West Bank. The Labour Party argued that the autonomy plan would eventually lead to the establishment of an independent Arab state. Labour preferred a "territorial compromise" the effect of which would be to place most of Judea and Samaria under Jordanian sovereignty.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the "Peace Now" movement was formed. Some of its spokesmen went so far as to suggest that Israel should even relinquish the Golan Heights, Israel's only barrier against Soviet-armed Syria. The "Peace Now" movement was of course praised by Sadat. Eventually it was more or less embraced by the Labour Party. The country was confused and divided, just as Sadat had calculated. He had achieved the second objective of the Nazi Model of Conquest.

Sadat's success in Israel was only surpassed by his success in the United States. His Jerusalem visit or visitation made him the darling of American television. The pipe-smoking dictator with his studiously cultivated Oxonian manners covering up the military disciplinarian won the hearts of the American people. When he subsequently visited Washington, President Carter hailed him as a "great man," a "man of destiny"; and with gushing sentimentalism declared "we'll miss you" as *Time's* "Man of the Year" was taking his leave from the White House.

Sadat accomplished what all the oil in Saudi Arabia could not accomplish: the American mass media were now openly pro-Arab and anti-Israel. It was this dramatic reversal of American public opinion that enabled Carter to propose, and the Senate to approve (by a narrow margin), the unprecedented Middle East arms package, allowing Egypt and Saudi Arabia to obtain, respectively, F-5E fighter aircraft and the even deadlier air superiority fighter-bomber, the F-15.*

Sadat could hardly have achieved more by his "peace initiative." He had succeeded in undermining Israel's "special relationship" with the United States—what Clausewitz would have called Israel's "center of gravity."¹⁸ He thereby fulfilled the third objective of the Nazi Model of Conquest — alienating the enemy from his friends or allies.

Nor, at home, did he cease from threats and anti-Semitic attacks upon Israelis and Jews, between which he clearly has difficulty distinguishing. For example, in an interview with *October* magazine on January 14, 1978, over a year after his supposed decision that there would be "no more war" with Israel, Sadat said: "What the Israelis in particular and the Jews in

*Retention of the Sinai air bases was thus made even more crucial for Israel's defense. With F-15s, the Saudis will be able to prevent air strikes against the 15-division Arab army now being amassed on Israel's eastern front.

general do not understand is that the tolerance and wish for peace which appeared after my initiative could, I fear, turn into something else against them. Then the Jews would complain anew of a wave of hatred, bitterness and mistrust of them ...They are a people who do not desire peace, nor do they desire natural coexistence among peoples because they want war and hatred to continue in order to profit from them.... Fear is the second skin of every Israeli or Jew who is not content with fear but seeks to frighten or make others afraid also."

It may of course be asked why, if Sadat is carrying out the pan-Arab goal of Israel's destruction, there has been so much hostility toward his initiative in the Arab world. Why do not all Arab states fall in line behind him to employ what he has made obvious are much more effective techniques for isolating and dividing Israel? In part the attack is an element in the strategy, immeasurably increasing Egypt's credibility in the West, making it appear that Egypt takes serious risks in its search for peace. On the other hand, some Arab leaders no doubt genuinely reject Sadat's methods. The very intensity of Arab hatred and the lack of sophistication of the Arab masses makes it difficult to accept and make understandable a subtle strategy of game-playing, maneuvering, and carrying a ball around opponents. Once a peace offensive is in full swing, the goal can only be hinted, no longer stated baldly. In addition, inter-Arab rivalry for leadership of the Arab world makes even Arab leaders who understand what Sadat is trying to do take advantage of the inevitable ambiguities of his overt position to rally support around themselves and against Egypt, whose position of traditional leadership of the Arab world has so far been hard for the others to challenge.

Chapter 2: SADAT-SOVIET COOPERATION

Sadat's plan to bring about Israel's downfall did not begin with his Jerusalem "peace initiative." It began with his preparations for the October War of 1973.

The October War was the culmination of a year-and-a-half long campaign of deception. The facts about that deception are available to the government of the United States. The evidence to be presented in this chapter is taken mainly from the testimony of the Sovietologist and Middle East expert, Professor Uri Ra'anani, who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 2, 1976.¹⁹

On the first anniversary of the October War, the Cairo weekly *Rose al-Yusuf*, published excerpts from a book by its military correspondent 'Abd al-Satar al-Tawila, called *The Six Hour War*. The paper explained that the correspondent was encouraged in his work and was even instructed by Sadat personally in the revision of his book, being given access to secret documents. Al-Tawila states that Sadat's "brilliant plan of camouflage prior to the October War was based on large-scale diplomatic activity" and that "the Egyptian deception plan exploited" the issue of Soviet arms and the attitude of the USSR "in a spectacular manner to mislead the opponent." He goes on to reveal that:

"the various government agencies spread rumors and stories that were exaggerated, to say the least, about deficiencies, both quantitative and qualitative, regarding the weapons required to begin the battle against Israel, at the very time when the two parties—Egypt and the USSR—had reached agreement concerning the supply of quantities of arms during the second half of 1973—weapons which, in fact, were beginning to arrive. And there came a time when we saw how the majority of habitués of coffee houses turned into arms experts and babbled about shortages in this or that type of hardware. Speaking in the jargon of the scientist and the expert, they would say that the Soviets were refusing to supply Egypt with missiles of a certain type and were even cutting off the supply of spare parts in such a manner that our planes, for example, had turned into useless scrap... Moreover, the Egyptian press frequently gave prominence to an inclination [in Cairo] to seek arms in the West.... All this talk about

armaments and their shortage was intended to create the impression in the ranks of the enemy that one of the reasons why Egypt was incapable of starting war was the absence of high-quality weapons.... And the whole world was taken by surprise when zero hour arrived.

The Egyptian camouflage to deceive the enemy was expanded to include Egyptian-Soviet relations. This was done to such an extent that many among the Arabs themselves cast doubt upon Egyptian-Soviet friendship...The episode of July 1972, when Egypt decided to make do without Soviet experts, was exploited and many...failed to hear the words of President Sadat...that this was no more than 'an interlude with our friend.'

One year later, in an interview broadcast by Cairo Radio in Arabic on October 24, 1975, Sadat confirmed the *Rose al-Yusuf* version, calling his July 1972 expulsion of 15,000 Soviet experts "a strategic cover... a splendid strategic distraction for our going to war."

The relevance of al-Tawila's disclosures is all the greater since precisely the same scenario is being presented now of an Egyptian-Soviet "break" accompanied allegedly by a halt, or at least a major slow-down, of the flow of Soviet weapons to Cairo, necessitating the substitution of Western arms. Once again "experts" speak of Egyptian arms shortages and weapons turning into scrap. Once again we hear of Egypt planning to free herself of her present dependence on Soviet military supply by a 10-year program of purchases from the West. Meanwhile the USSR is displaying curiously little concern (as was also the case during the 1972-73 period of the widely advertised "rift" between the two governments).

This is not to deny that Egyptian-Soviet relations have their ups and downs, including sharp exchanges of words between the capitals, the closing down of consulates, and even the abrogation of treaties. However, all this does not significantly affect the *military* relationship between the two regimes. As for Sadat's turning to Western military suppliers, this is bound to strengthen pro-Egyptian interests in countries where public sympathy has tended to favor Israel. At the same time, it enables Egyptian forces to become familiar with the very same technology that constitutes the mainstay of the Israeli army. But as to whether Western suppliers can replace Soviet arms, here is what Sadat said on August 21, 1975, in an interview reported by Cairo Radio in Arabic:

"If I wanted to replace the quantities of Soviet arms I have, I would need at least twenty years. The war factories in Europe

[and this applies to the United States] are owned by companies which cannot produce the same quantities as those produced by the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union allocates an enormous part of its industries to war production. Therefore it can give quantities which are difficult for others..."

While the estimate of "at least twenty years" seems exaggerated, it should be borne in mind that the Egyptian General Staff would require fundamental reeducation from its Moscow Frunze Academy training, were it to switch to an entirely new systems of planning, logistics, and operations, based upon different hardware and the military doctrine that accompanies it. Sadat himself showed awareness of this factor when he said on December 9, 1975: "90 percent of my arms come from the Soviet Union, and I am not mad enough to think I can change my arms in a few years. It is not feasible."

Despite mutual recriminations aired for international consumption, Egypt continues to be armed by the Soviet Union. Published U.S. and NATO intelligence reports indicate that "Egypt continued to receive extensive resupplies of Soviet weapons at least through 1977 [that is, beyond the date of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem]. Egyptian ground forces have already surpassed 1973 levels, and her inventory contains more T-62 tanks, night vision equipment, missiles and missile-bearing helicopters. The Egyptian airforce has been strengthened qualitatively by receipt of such sophisticated aircraft as improved MiG 21's, MiG 23's, Sukhoi 17's and Sukhoi 20's."²⁰ This weaponry has been shipped to Egypt via Soviet satellites and Kuwait. What we see here is a replay of the 1972 charade by which the wily Sadat deceived Israel as well as the United States. But this is only the tip of the iceberg.

In an article appearing in *Al-Ahram* on October 31, 1975, Sadat's close friend and confidant, 'Abd al-Quddis, revealed that the so-called expulsion of Soviet experts during the summer of 1972 in fact was not an Egyptian unilateral anti-Soviet move, as it has been portrayed so widely, but a triangular arrangement between Cairo, Damascus, and Moscow. "Actually, the very Soviet experts who had served in Egypt were transferred [with Sadat's approval] to Syria [but only after having completed their mission which was to install a network of missiles on the west bank of the Suez Canal in preparation for the canal crossing of October 6, 1973]." This cooperation between Sadat, Syria and the Soviet Union requires close analysis.

In the Arab war-and-peace strategy against Israel, Sadat plays the role of "moderate," while Assad plays the role of "radical." Meantime, the Soviets supply both with military hardware, the one indirectly and

covertly, the other directly and openly. Now, by posing as a "moderate" on the one hand, and by creating the impression of an Egyptian-Soviet rift on the other, Sadat has encouraged the United States to believe that it could supplant the Soviet Union and minimize its influence in the Middle East. What is remarkable, however, is that this strategy did not originate in Cairo but in Moscow!

Sadat himself admitted that "In Moscow they know the facts as much as I do. They told Nasser more than once, when he met them in Moscow following the 1967 defeat: 'Go and talk to the Americans.' During the four times I went to Moscow as President, they used to tell me: 'Go and open a dialogue and talk to the Americans.' Gromyko also told Isma'il Fahmi: 'The United States owns the essential cards in this game. This is a clear fact to all ...'"²¹

There are sound reasons for believing that Sadat, in this case, is telling the truth. Senior Soviet analysts had been urging Egypt and Syria to adopt a strategy whereby the United States would be induced to do for them what these Arab countries, even with Soviet military assistance, were unable to achieve for themselves on the battlefield. As Ra'anani points out in a geopolitical analysis made just prior to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1975:

"The Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, was and is very eager to recover lost Arab territories for its Middle Eastern clients since the Israeli presence there is a visible reminder of Moscow's inability to "deliver." Needless to say, however, the Russians hope to achieve this aim at no major cost to themselves. What they have done is to tell their clients that an open confrontation with the West is not in the cards. Consequently, Moscow has asked its clients for time, promising that it will gradually maneuver the United States into doing the job of handing back the lost territories of Russia's Middle Eastern allies. How this aim was to be achieved could be learned from a detailed analysis which was printed in the Soviet magazine *The U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology*. The author, Ye. Primakov, is generally believed to occupy an influential position within the 'apparat' concerned with Middle Eastern affairs. Primakov's major emphasis is on the divisions within the United States on Middle East policies.... On the one hand, he says, there are the so-called Gulf of Mexico oil interests. They have most of their investments in the Western Hemisphere and feel that there are sufficient oil reserves in that region for the Middle East to remain of secondary importance.... However, Primakov says, there is another group, the so-called Atlantic oil interests. This group has strong supporters in the State Department. These circles have

huge investments in the Middle East.... They keep pushing the White House and the Pentagon to abandon the line of measured deterrence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, because it also implies containing Russia's Arab clients who, if they are not oil producers, at least control oil transit lines. Consequently, these Atlantic oil interests demand a policy of appeasement toward the Arab countries. Primakov comments that, to be sure, the final aims of these circles and of Moscow are different; he implies however that their immediate objectives are similar. He expects the Atlantic oil interests to win in the end. He infers that the unwritten, short-term alliance between these interests, the U.S. State Department, and the Kremlin will succeed in pressuring the United States and, through it, the Israelis to withdraw unilaterally, without the Soviet Union or its allies having to pay any very serious price for this withdrawal. There are reasons for thinking that this analysis is precisely what the Soviet Union has been presenting to its friends in Cairo and Damascus.^{22"}

Primakov does not reveal, for obvious reasons, just how the Soviet Union is going to cooperate, as it were, with the "Atlantic oil interests" in bringing pressure to bear on Washington to appease the Arabs and compel Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders. The strategy has already been anticipated. Moscow's public posture must be critical of Egypt; it must cooperate with Sadat in fostering the myth of an Egyptian-Soviet rift, thereby encouraging the United States to believe that it can replace the Soviet Union as Egypt's major arms supplier. Only then will Washington have sufficient incentive to pressure Israel into surrendering the territories now in question.

Thus, while the Soviet Union was condemning the 1975 Sinai Agreement, accusing Sadat of betraying the Arab cause, the Israeli Communist Party, with four members in the Knesset, and with almost slavish obedience to Moscow, announced, at a time when confirmation of the Agreement was still in doubt, that it would add its 4 votes to those of the Government's supporters in order to insure that the Agreement would be implemented!

It is in this light that we are to understand Moscow's denunciation of the Sadat "peace initiative" and the results of the Camp David Summit. The stratagem was baldly revealed by Lufti al-Khuli in *Al-Ahram*, on February 11, 1976:

U.S.-Israeli coordination is no longer "total"... In view of this, Egypt has decided that the political response to the new reality requires that Egyptian-Soviet coordination should also stop

being "total" and be confined only to the general outlines. Otherwise, the Israeli-U.S. contradictions would not continue and there would be again an Arab-Soviet front facing an Israeli-U.S. front. Egypt welcomes a certain degree of coordination with the Soviets provided that the Soviet reaction does not exceed the limits of Egypt's visualization of the effect on mutual coordination between Tel Aviv and Washington."

Al-Khuli has frequently served as an unofficial intermediary between Cairo and Moscow. "What he is saying," says Ra'anan, "is that Egypt wishes the Soviet leadership to collude with it in playing down the degree of intimacy between the two regimes, since any public reflection of effective coordination between them is likely to reverse the trend of estrangement between the United States and Israel which Sadat has fostered so successfully."²⁴ It would appear, however, that the collusion was inspired by Moscow.

By Sadat's own admission, it was Moscow that urged him to "talk to the Americans." The Russians would hardly advise him to do this unless they were prepared to orchestrate the deception of an Egyptian-Soviet rift.

As already suggested, the success of this deception depends largely on the widespread and mistaken belief that Egypt's acquisition of Western and especially U.S. arms will result in the substitution of American for Russian leverage. The trouble is that Moscow can always outbid Washington. In Ra'anan's analysis:

If Carter offers Sadat half of the Sinai, then Moscow, of course, will "remind" Egypt that it should have all of the Sinai. If Carter then somehow obtains all of the Sinai for Sadat, the Kremlin will point out that Egypt, prior to 1967, also held the Gaza Strip and that it would be a betrayal of the Arab cause to neglect the West Bank and the Golan Heights. If Carter subsequently proceeds to pressure Israel into a total rollback to the pre-1967 demarcation lines, the Soviet leadership merely has to point out to Egypt that, as all official Soviet maps have shown consistently, the USSR acknowledges as legitimate only the territorial lines of the abortive 1947 U.N. Partition Plan, which would whittle down Israeli territory way beyond the 1949 Armistice lines.²⁵

In fact, Sadat's confidant, al-Quddis, revealed the scenario for this piecemeal destruction of Israel in *Al-Ahram*. In an article dated November 14, 1975, he stated: "Israel is experiencing a feeling of waning or 'withering.' This withering will not stop even if Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders...This waning may make Israel face the Security Council resolution of 1948 which calls for returning the Arab lands to their owners

or compensating them The Arabs, of course, refuse any compensation and insist on recovering the land, that is, they are compelling Israel to return to the Partition Resolution of 1947." Needless to say, Israel would then cease to exist.

That this is Sadat's ultimate objective has already been shown. Is it also the Soviet Union's? The Soviet maps referred to above indicate an affirmative answer.

The Soviets are arming the Arabs to advance, obviously, their own global interests. Their primary objective in the Middle East is to gain control of the Persian Gulf. Control of the Gulf would give the Communists an economic stranglehold especially on Western Europe so heavily dependent on Arab oil.* The effect of this would be to shatter NATO and Sovietize Western Europe. With control of Europe's highly skilled, industrial population on the one hand, and strategic superiority over the United States on the other, the Soviets would become the masters of the globe.

The state of Israel is the major obstacle to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, hence to the Soviet drive for world conquest. Kremlin strategists are using Sadat to remove that obstacle. True, Sadat has his own vast ambitions: Egyptian hegemony in the upper reaches and sources of the Nile, in the North African littoral, particularly Libya, in the eastern half of the Arab world, especially Syria (with which Egypt has attempted several times to merge), and at the entrance to the Red Sea, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Yemen, thus exposing Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

But Sadat is only a pawn on the global chessboard. The Arab world is hopelessly backward, lacking the science, technology, and resources to compete with the Soviet Union. Sadat is using Moscow to achieve his objectives against Israel. Moscow is allowing itself to be used by Sadat so that with the elimination of Israel it can dominate the Middle East and ultimately the world.

*This applies also to Japan (whose oil tankers from the Persian Gulf pass through the vulnerable Malacca Straits).

Chapter 3: "PEACE IN OUR TIME" — THE AMERICAN ROLE

In the meantime the United States, both globally and in the Middle East, pursues the policy of "peace in our time." Sadat's diplomacy has enabled the United States, with better grace, to embark upon a policy of weakening Israel to the point where her ability to defend herself will be undermined. The United States is seeking to reduce the temptation of the Soviet Union to intervene directly against Israel (rather than through her Arab clients) for fear that this might push the United States into a confrontation with Soviet power. Thus an obvious factor propelling the United States into pressuring Israel into asymmetrical agreements with undemocratic and in the long run politically unreliable Arab regimes is the growing disparity of military power in favor of the Soviet Union. This has led to a United States policy of appeasement of larger powers at the expense of smaller powers, even when the price, as in the case of Taiwan, is termination of a treaty of defense with an ally. (The United States is now in the ludicrous position of being bound by treaty obligations for an additional year to a country whose existence it no longer recognizes!) But equally, perhaps even more important, has been the shift in perception to which Sadat's clever tactics have contributed substantially. Arab demands are seen as legitimate and Israel's effort to preserve her viability as a state is seen as "inflexibility."

The parallel between the fate of Czechoslovakia at Munich and the treatment of Israel by the West is often drawn but generally without clear explanation of why it is appropriate. It therefore seems worthwhile to devote some attention to the events at Munich. The following account is based largely on the records of the Chamberlain Cabinet of 1938 and related documents. The reader need only change the names of persons and places to see why the parallel is overwhelming—once again a democracy is being sacrificed by a great power for the sake of an illusory peace.

Let us begin with a telegram sent by Sir Neville Henderson, England's ambassador in Berlin, to the British Foreign Office.

I do not envy Lord Runciman [in his mission to Prague, seeking to persuade President Benes to make certain concessions, i.e. to grant the Germans in the Sudetenland autonomy or self-rule]... The Czechs are a pig-headed race

and Benes not the least pig-headed among them War would doubtless serve the purpose of all the Jews and doctrinaires in a world for whom Nazism is anathema, but it would be a terrible risk for Germany herself.... That this is not apparent to Hitler I cannot believe.

Henderson was cautiously optimistic. He noted that as long as the Germans trusted the British and had "confidence in the sincerity and impartiality of our effort, the battle is not lost." The stubborn Czechs would have to make concessions. "We shall have at long last to put our foot down very firmly and say to Benes 'You *must*.'"

England's policy of "even-handedness" combined appeasement of a dictatorship with the application of diplomatic pressure—really black-mail—against a democracy. But even for Chamberlain appeasement required the underpinning of moral justification. None more powerful could be found than the democratic principle of self-determination.

While democratic morality might call for self-determination, Benes knew that its application in the Sudetenland would result in the dismemberment and destruction of democratic Czechoslovakia. Without the Sudetenland's defensible borders the country would be at Hitler's mercy and its defensive alliance with France would be worthless. And so Benes was unyielding. His country's security was not negotiable—the democratic principle of self-determination and Hitler's threats notwithstanding. Besides, there was nothing democratic about Nazi Germany.

Chamberlain urged moderation and flexibility. Surely the differences between the Germans and the Czechs could be resolved. To his Birmingham constituents Chamberlain declared in April 1938: "Do not forget we are all members of the human race, and subject to the like passions and affections, and fears and desires. There must be something in common between us if only we can find it." Little did Chamberlain know that in the previous month, the Sudeten extremist, Konrad Henlein, met secretly with Hitler and urged: "We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied."

This, of course, was Hitler's own strategy toward the democracies. He knew that precisely because England and France feared war more than he did, they would the more readily make territorial concessions for "peace." Hence Hitler's sometimes veiled, sometimes public, threats that if the Sudetens were not granted self-determination, he would invade Czechoslovakia.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Britain and France should warn Czechoslovakia that they would abandon her if she were not more

flexible. Indeed, Henderson confided to the German States Secretary Weizsacker that "Britain would not think of risking one sailor or airman for Czechoslovakia." Of course this only encouraged Hitler.

Eventually, Benes reacted to Anglo-French pressure. On September 4, 1938 he offered the Sudetens a plan for regional self-rule, but under the ultimate sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. Hitler was enraged.

Two days later, Nazis were assembling for the annual Nuremberg rally, where, on September 12, Hitler would speak. Henderson wanted *The Times* and the British press in general "to write up Hitler as the apostle of Peace." On September 7, *The Times*, without going quite that far, nonetheless went beyond any of Hitler's demands:

If the Sudetens now ask for more than the Czech Government are ready to give in their latest set of proposals, it can only be inferred that the Germans are going beyond the mere removal of disabilities for those who do not find themselves at ease within the Czechoslovak Republic. In that case it might be worth while for the Czechoslovak Government to consider whether they should exclude altogether the project, which has found favor in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous state by the cession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation to which they are united by race.

This was virtually calling for the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Third Reich, which, of course, Hitler had in mind, but which he knew he could accomplish by orchestrating threats with the dogma of self-determination.

Meanwhile, Goering addressed the Nuremberg rally on 10 September. "A petty segment of Europe is harassing the human race," cried the man whom Sir Neville considered the most moderate of the Nazi leaders. In contrast, a speech broadcast by Benes that evening was quiet and reasonable. "Let us all preserve calmness... but let us be optimistic, and above all, let us not forget that faith and goodwill will move mountains."

Hitler addressed the rally on September 12 as scheduled. After the roaring Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! subsided, the Fuhrer began to speak: "You will understand, my comrades, that a Great Power cannot for a second time suffer an infamous encroachment upon its rights." The Sudeten, shouted Hitler, were "tortured creatures." Let the world know, however, that "the Germans in Czechoslovakia are neither defenseless nor deserted." Almost immediately after Hitler's diatribe riots flared in the Sudetenland. Here was a pretext for a German invasion.

Accordingly, Chamberlain decided on a bold plan. He would fly to Berlin and speak to Hitler personally, bypassing (then) conventional diplomacy. He briefed the Cabinet. The Cabinet discussed the best reply if Hitler demanded a plebiscite in the Sudetenland. Chamberlain thought the demand should not be totally rejected. He suggested that England might join France in a guarantee of the rest of Czechoslovakia. "I realize that we could not save Czechoslovakia if Germany decided to overrun it. The value of the guarantee would lie in its deterrent effect"!

Meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 15, Chamberlain agreed in principle to the separation of the Sudetenland, which meant its incorporation into Germany. Returning to London, he expressed the belief that Hitler could be trusted. "I formed the opinion that Herr Hitler's objectives are strictly limited.... When he had included the Sudeten Germans in the Reich he would be satisfied."

It was now necessary to gain the cooperation of France. However, Daladier, the French Premier, was opposed to a plebiscite. This was Hitler's technique for German expansion in Austria. As Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, was to point out: first Hitler would introduce in the Sudetenland "*Ministers with Nazi tendencies... a kind of federation ...a quasi-autonomy... and then attachment to Germany.*"

Nevertheless, in a meeting with Chamberlain on September 17, Daladier said that "if friendly pressure were brought to bear on Benes," it might be possible to persuade the Czechs to agree to "giving up some portion of Sudeten territory." But this the Czechs could hardly be expected to do unless Britain and France "could assure them of some sort of international guarantee of what remained." And Germany would have to be a party to the guarantee. Chamberlain agreed. Indeed, the notion of international guarantees became part of his appeasement policy.

A joint Anglo-French plan was drawn up and transmitted to Prague on September 20. Benes' first reaction was to reject it outright. He was convinced that the plan would lead to the mutilation of Czechoslovakia, that it would not bring peace. But Benes was not the only voice in the Czech government. The Czech Prime Minister, Milan Hodza, secretly informed the British ambassador in Prague that "If I can deliver a kind of ultimatum to President Benes ... he and his Government will feel able to bow the knee to *force majeure.*" The ultimatum was not long in coming; Benes capitulated.

Isolated voices protested this betrayal. Said Churchill: "The partition of Czechoslovakia under pressure from England and France amounts to the complete surrender of the Western democracies to the Nazi threat of force."

Chamberlain's subsequent meetings with Hitler, the last at Munich on September 30 — October 1 was the dictator's deadline — merely confirmed the betrayal at Berchtesgaden. Czechoslovakia's fate was sealed.

The parallels to the behavior of the United States toward Israel are so obvious they scarcely require elucidation. In the name of self-determination Israel is to lose its ability to defend itself as she is pressured to give up military control of Judea and Samaria. (Shortly after the Six Day War Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Britain's eminent military expert, pointed out that with a more efficient plan of attack on Israel's eastern front, the Arabs could have cut the state in two at its narrow waist in one hour.) Instead of borders it can defend Israel is to be given the sort of "guarantees" Czechoslovakia obtained for her truncated territory and which in the event proved absolutely worthless.

There is the same unwillingness to believe in the reality of an adversary's goals, even when they are openly stated. Islamic attitudes toward territory—i.e. that Islamic territory, and most especially the Islamic heartland (which is the way Palestine is viewed by the Arabs) cannot pass into the hands of unbelievers—are simply not given credence. The failure to understand the power of resurgent Islamic feeling has most recently been demonstrated of course in the case of Iran, the strength of whose "mullahs" amazed the West. Even in Turkey, the most Westernized of states inhabited by Moslems, Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise with consequences that may soon once again take the West by unpleasant surprise. In some respects there is less excuse for the behavior of the United States in relation to Israel than there was for that of England in relation to Czechoslovakia. Hitler had only been guilty of imperialistic rhetoric toward his neighbors up to the point when he made his demands on Czechoslovakia. The Arab states have attacked Israel four times and in between wars have kept up a steady barrage of hit and run attacks upon her territory and population. Three of those wars were conducted *prior* to Israel's acquisition of the territory now in question. But the United States only replies: "Forget the past. This time the Arabs really want peace." It does not want to know of the obscene hatred of Jews that fills the government-controlled Arab press, that is propagated in the government-controlled schools and universities, and which animates the governments of the Arab world. Sadat plays on the widespread fear of another Middle Eastern war, a war that could result not only in another oil embargo, but a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Thus, early in his Knesset speech, he warns of an "inevitable disaster" that will befall the entire world if his peace initiative fails. "The resulting slaughter" he reiterates later on "would bear the curse of humanity and of history." ("I would of course be sorry," said Hitler, "if a world war should result from the problem.")

Sadat can be said to engage in deception only in the short-term. Like Hitler, who also engaged in short-term deception by asserting that various intermediate demands were "all" that he wanted, he has made amply clear his long range purposes. And as in 1938 Western statesmen see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil. Again they are ready to sacrifice smaller peoples without realizing that by standing up for them they might save *themselves* from disasters. Now the Western world can only engage in reveries of what might have been if the war against Hitler had been waged with the cooperation of a Czechoslovakia in possession of the strongest army, defenses and military arsenal in Europe. There may yet be dreams of what might have been if the strongest army in the Middle East had been able to defend Western interests in its present boundaries. Let us hope George Orwell's pessimism will turn out to have been greater than was warranted: "A generation of the unteachable is hanging upon us like a necklace of corpses."

CHAPTER 1

1. *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 13.
2. Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (London: Hutchinson & Co., Radius Book, 1972), Ralph Manheim, trans., pp. 163, 166.
3. It must be unique in the writing of autobiographies to say, as Sadat does, "I'd like at this point to remind the American people..." (304).
4. In his "autobiography," Sadat writes at length about his imprisonment, but studiously avoids any reference to his pro-Nazi activities.
5. Cited in D.F. Green, *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel* (Geneva: Academy of Islamic Research, 1976), p. 87. See Sadat's so-called October Working Paper of 1974, a 25-year master plan for the reconstruction of Egypt. The plan speaks of Egypt as the leader of Arab nationalism. "We have a right to say that by our method of movement, we have... risen above biddings and bargains, and wage for the first time, a military battle accompanied by a comprehensive vision of all its combat, political, and psychological requirements." (Note that the political and psychological are parts of the military battle.)
6. D.F. Green, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.
7. Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 264.
8. See *Who Sent Rudolf Hess*, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13, where Hess, in a speech designed primarily for foreign consumption, repeatedly says "let us be honest."
9. *Mein Kampf*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
10. In the words of Professor al-Rahman al-Bazzaz of Baghdad University: "The existence of Israel nullifies the unity of our homeland, the unity of our nation and the unity of our civilization, which embraces the whole of this region. Moreover, the existence of Israel is a flagrant challenge to our philosophy of life and the ideals for which we live and a total barrier against the values and aims to which we aspire in the world." Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972), p. 97.
In the West, religion is, for the most part, a fringe issue, playing only a small part in people's lives or possibly none at all. In the Islamic world, where there is no separation of church and state, religion claims the whole of men's lives.
11. *October*, Sep. 11, 1977 (translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sep. 21, 1977.)
12. *Ibid.*
13. Middle East News Agency 2012 GMT, 3 Sept. 1977, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sep. 6, 1977.
14. *October*, Sep. 11, 1977.
15. Quoted in Paul Eidelberg "Can Israel Save the U.S.?", *Midstream*, Dec. 1978, p. 5.
16. *Mein Kampf*, p. 187.
17. During the Eichmann trial, the Jordanian English language daily, *Jerusalem Times*, published an "Open Letter to Eichmann" on April 24, 1961, declaring, in part: "...by liquidating six million [Jews] you have...conferred a real blessing on humanity...find solace in the fact that this trial will one day culminate in the liquidation of the remaining six million to avenge your blood..." Harkabi, *op. cit.*, p. 279. Note that the letter was written at a time when the West Bank was under Jordanian control. It is a commentary on the moderation of King Hussein.

18. As a professional military man, Sadat is no doubt familiar with Karl von Clausewitz's *On War*, the greatest work on military science. The principles of this book, though formulated in the early part of the 19th century, are as applicable to nuclear war as to guerrilla and conventional war. One of the key principles of *On War* is that of attacking the enemy toward its "center of gravity." As Clausewitz explains: The main point is to keep the predominant conditions of both adversaries in view. Out of them a certain center of gravity, a center of power and movement, will form of itself, upon which everything depends; and against this center of gravity of the enemy the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed."The enemy's center of gravity is the necessary but vulnerable precondition of his strength. With respect to Israel, Clausewitz's dictum that "in small states dependent on greater ones it lies generally in the army of their allies" would seem to apply. However, because the army or military power of Israel's ally, the United States, cannot itself be directly attacked, it must be outflanked by an assault on "public opinion"-in a democracy, a force more powerful than armies.

CHAPTER 2

19. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., on the Proposed Sale to Egypt of Six C-13 Aircraft and Training of Egyptian Personnel, March 31, and April 2, 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). To facilitate the exposition, some paraphrase of Ra'anan's testimony will be employed.

20. New York Times, April 23, 1978, p. E5. For a detailed statement of Soviet weaponry to Egypt from 1972-76, see Ra'anan's testimony, *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

21. Hearings, *op. cit.*, p. 61

22. *Ibid*, p. 61-2.

23. *Ibid*, p. 69.

24. *Ibid*, p. 70.

25. *Ibid*, p. 65.