


**SHOULD
AMERICA
GUARANTEE
ISRAEL'S
SAFETY**

by
DR. IRVING MOSKOWITZ

With Introduction by Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato



About the Author

Dr. Irving Moskowitz, a former president of the Zionist Organization of America (Western States Region) and the Jewish National Fund (Western Division), writes "One Minute to Midnight," a weekly column on Jewish affairs that appears in many newspapers.

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INTRODUCTION

by **Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato**

The friendship between the United States and Israel has been anchored in shared values, common strategic interests, and respect for each other's independence. Israelis have always insisted on fighting their own battles, a position that the U.S., with its own battles to fight elsewhere around the globe has deeply appreciated.

Would it be wise to depart from the traditional parameters of the American-Israeli relationship? That is the question explored in this monograph, in response to recent suggestions that U.S. troops should be stationed in territories to be surrendered by Israel to its Arab neighbors, or that other U.S. "security guarantees" should be provided as a hedge against future Arab aggression against the Jewish State.

The premises underlying such proposals are troubling. They presume, first of all, that Israeli retention of a few tiny slivers of land is the obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace, when the historical record shows that the Arab world's refusal to accept a Jewish state of any size has always been the true obstacle. Furthermore, the suggestion that American soldiers are needed to protect Israel from future Arab attack raises serious questions about the trustworthiness of the Arab regimes upon whose good faith Israel is supposed to rely. In other words, if the Arabs really want peace, why does Israel need "protection" against them? And if it is not absolutely certain that the Arabs will live in peace with Israel, how can anybody ask the Israelis to vacate strategically vital territories?

These issues raise a related question: should Israel and the U.S. commit themselves to treaties that depend on the signatures of Arab dictators who could change their minds--or be overthrown--at any moment? America has had plenty of

bitter experience with tyrants in that part of the world--from the anti-American shift by Iran after the overthrow of the Shah, to Iraq's abrogation of its 1963 recognition of Kuwait, leading to the Gulf War. Should American lives depend on the whims of some trigger-happy Arab despot?

Another critical issue explored in this monograph is the impact of domestic developments on America's foreign policy commitments. American voters have every right to reassess the national agenda, to elect a president or congressmen who would reverse the policies of their predecessors. At the same time, however, a country such as Israel therefore has no choice but to consider the likelihood of future changes in the American mood before it surrenders territories that would leave it vulnerable in the event such a reordering of U.S. national priorities took place. If some future president should one day decide that keeping American troops in the Middle East is too expensive, or too dangerous, where will that leave our Israeli friends? These are issues that require a thorough public debate today, before the signing of any treaties that, despite all good intentions, could ultimately prove detrimental to Israeli and American interests.

"One hears a great deal these days, from people whose vision is shorter even than their memories, about the wisdom of international guarantees as a means of assuring Israeli security. I can't imagine a more misdirected policy than to ask Israel, which has been the model of the self-reliant ally, to transform itself into an American dependency...Much of the history of international guarantees is the history of countries who have lost their territory, their freedom and even their sons and daughters . . . It is a history that the Israelis, for their reasons, and we, for ours, ought to do everything possible to avoid."

--Senator Henry M. Jackson, December 18, 1973


The United States will consider offering Israel some kind of "security guarantees" in conjunction with an Israeli surrender of the Golan Heights, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared in June.¹ Such "guarantees" might include American troops being stationed between the Israeli and Syrian lines, according to Defense Secretary Les Aspin.² An even more explicit description of this possibility was recently offered by Israeli cabinet minister Moshe Shahal, who said that the Israeli government and the Clinton administration have discussed an arrangement whereby Israel would withdraw from the Golan and American soldiers would be stationed in some parts of the territory for a period of 15 years.³

Such a commitment on the part of the United States would represent a startling departure from the norms of the traditional American-Israeli relationship. Unlike America's other allies around the world, Israel has never requested that U.S. soldiers risk their lives to protect Israel from its Arab attackers. The Jewish State has only asked that the U.S., in the framework of a mutually beneficial strategic relationship, provide Israel with the military assistance it needs to fight its own battles. For more than four decades, Israel has stood alone in the Middle East as an outpost of Western values, as a guardian of Western interests in a strategically crucial region, and as an unbending buffer, first against Soviet encroachment,

and now against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Israel freely shared vital intelligence data with the United States. Israel battle-tested American weapons. Israel took military action at America's request, as in 1970 when an Israeli show of force prevented Syria's invasion of Jordan. In return, the U.S. has generously provided Israel with the weapons it has needed to defend itself against Arab invasions and terrorism. But never was there any suggestion that America should send its troops to fight for Israel, as they fought for South Korea, South Vietnam, Grenada or Kuwait. On the contrary, the Israelis have always prided themselves on their independence and self-reliance. It makes no sense for the United States to deviate from the norms of this time-honored, and consistently productive, relationship with Israel.

Perhaps it is not surprising that there are those who assume that a foreign military presence would be necessary to protect the Jewish State, when one considers the vulnerability of the pre-1967 borders to which the Clinton administration apparently expects Israel to retreat. If it surrenders the disputed territories, Israel would be reduced to a strip of land just nine miles wide. The well-equipped Arab armies that surround it would have little trouble slicing the country in two. What portion of those territories would Israel need to protect itself? To answer that question, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, shortly after the 1967 war, to study Israel's borders and determine, "without regard to political factors," what territory Israel needed to retain to defend itself against future Arab aggression. Their conclusions are instructive.

Regarding the Golan Heights, the Joint Chiefs noted that before 1967, the Syrians had used the Heights to launch "sabotage and terrorist acts," and also to carry out "shellings of villages from the high ground overlooking the [Galilee]." Therefore, the Joint Chiefs concluded, "Israel must hold the commanding terrain east of the [pre-1967] boundary...To



Recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1967

provide a defense in-depth. Israel would need a strip of about 15 miles [on the Golan]" --an area even larger than that which Israel currently holds.

Surveying Israel's security needs in Judea and Samaria, the Joint Chiefs found that the area had been used for "sabotage and mining activity" by Palestinian Arab terrorists before Israel took over in 1967. Furthermore, the high ground running north-south through the middle of (Judea and Samaria] overlooks Israel's narrow midsection and offers a route for a thrust to the sea which would split the country in two parts.' At "a minimum." the Joint Chiefs concluded. Israel needs to control that high ground—in other words, an area comprising the majority of the Judea-Samaria region.

With regard to the Gaza Strip, the Joint Chiefs minced no words: Israel needs the entire territory. "By occupying the Gaza Strip. Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for *eight*. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel's military advantage."

The question that must he faced then, is whether or not the U.S. should urge Israel to put itself in a vulnerable position, surrendering those vital strategic territories and relying on American troops to defend it against future Arab attacks. Would the U.S. be prepared to activate those troops and risk their lives if a Syrian-Israeli crisis develops? Is it possible to be confident that five or ten years from now, U.S. public opinion will support such military action? How will Americans *react* when U.S. troops in the Golan are attacked by the same fanatical anti-American Hezbollah terrorists who attacked them in nearby Lebanon not so long ago?

What is at stake is not the sincerity of America's intentions, but rather the inevitability of America's ever-shifting agenda. Political and social circumstances often produce sharp changes in public and Congressional perceptions

of U.S. military interests abroad. Commitments made with all good intentions by one administration may fall by the wayside when a different administration, with different goals and a different worldview, assumes power. The history of American guarantees to its small allies is not a laundry list of betrayals but rather a manifestation of the simple reality that in a democracy, voters, Congressmen and presidents often change their minds about commitments made by their predecessors.

U.S. GUARANTEES: THE CASE OF VIETNAM

Warfare carried out by the Communist forces in northern Vietnam resulted in an agreement, in 1954, by the French colonial authorities to withdraw from the country. Determined "to prevent the loss in northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific" (as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it), the United States initiated the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol, known as SEATO. It was intended to protect the southern portion of Vietnam (the non-Communist region), as well as neighboring Cambodia and Laos, against Communist aggression by promising that any "armed attack- upon those regions would be regarded by the United States as "endangering its own peace and safety."

The gradual escalation of North Vietnamese attacks upon South Vietnam persuaded the United States to act on its SEATO pledge. After the North Vietnamese attacked a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson for the first time dispatched American military forces on an offensive mission against the North. Pointing to America's obligation "to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty," Johnson sought, and received, overwhelming Congressional approval (466 to 0 in the House, 88-2 in the

Senate) for U.S. military action in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution authorized the president "to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." It was, Johnson said, "the spirit that motivated us to give our support to the defense of Western Europe in the 1940s [that] led us in the 1950s to make a similar promise to Southeast Asia"--and that promise had to be kept. After all, Johnson once remarked, to surrender Southeast Asia to the Communists meant that "we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to our treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept."⁶

As direct American military involvement in the Vietnamese war increased, so did domestic opposition to the U.S. role. By the time Richard Nixon was elected president in 1968, the Vietnam controversy had engulfed American society. Mass demonstrations against U.S. involvement, combined with escalating criticism by Congress and the media of American policy, challenged the Nixon administration's declared commitment to the protection of South Vietnam. In theory, Nixon felt as strongly about America's guarantees to the South Vietnamese as had his predecessors. "If we suddenly reneged on our earlier pledges of support, because they had become difficult or costly to carry out, or because they had become unpopular at home, we would not be worthy of the trust of other nations and we certainly would not receive it," he asserted. But at the same time, Nixon was anxious to extricate the U.S. from that increasingly unpopular war, even if that meant risking South Vietnam's future. Henry Kissinger, the architect of the 1973 treaty that provided for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, was quoted in 1968 as privately remarking that "the appropriate goal of the U.S. policy was a 'decent interval' --two to three years--between the withdrawal of U.S. troops and a Communist takeover in Vietnam."⁷

The terms of the treaty to which Nixon and Kissinger agreed allowed the 120,000 North Vietnamese troops then occupying portions of South Vietnam to remain where they were. The South Vietnamese vehemently protested the treaty, but to no avail. In order to persuade the South Vietnamese to go along with the agreement, Nixon guaranteed them, in writing, that America would return if needed: "You have my absolute assurance," he wrote to the South Vietnamese leaders on November 14, 1972, "that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action."⁸ On January 5, 1973, Nixon repeated that pledge, promising that "we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam."⁹ Whatever Nixon's ultimate intentions, his guarantees were soon made moot by Congressional action: all funds for U.S. military action in Southeast Asia were cut off shortly thereafter.¹⁰ Nixon himself was forced to resign the following year as a result of the Watergate scandal, and by the time the North Vietnamese were ready to begin their final conquest of the South, the guarantees of SEATO had given way to the reality of American withdrawal, and the promises offered by Nixon had been obviated by Congress.

U.S. GUARANTEES: THE CASE OF TAIWAN

Citizens of Taiwan who were keeping an eye on the American presidential campaign of 1976 must have been impressed by the statements made by the Democratic candidate regarding America's longstanding pledge to protect their tiny island nation from Communist China. "We are bound by a treaty to guarantee the freedom of Formosa, Taiwan, the Republic of China," Jimmy Carter declared at one point in the campaign. "I wouldn't go back on a commitment that we have had to assure that Taiwan is protected from military takeover."¹¹ During one of the televised debates between the

two contenders, Carter reiterated that he "would never let that friendship (with Peking) stand in the way of preservation of the independence and freedom of the people of Taiwan."¹²

Carter's statements were faithful to longstanding U.S. policy. Following the conquest of mainland China by Communist forces in 1949, the Chinese nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the neighboring island of Taiwan, where with American support, they established themselves as the Republic of China. Their Communist rivals, declaring themselves to be the People's Republic of China, refused to relinquish their claim to Taiwan. Threats by Red China to Quemoy and other small islands off the Taiwan coast in the early 1950s prompted the Eisenhower administration to formalize its commitment to protect Taiwan from Communist aggression by signing a U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, in December 1954. The text of the Defense Treaty committed the U.S. "to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities" aimed at Taiwan's "territorial integrity and political stability." (Article B). The U.S. pledged (Article V) that it would regard any "armed attack in the west Pacific area directed against the territories of (Taiwan)" to be "dangerous to its own peace and safety." and "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."¹³

Not surprisingly, Red China was furious at America's commitment to Taiwan. It conditioned the establishment of relations with the U.S. on full American recognition of Communist China as the sole legitimate government of both the mainland and Taiwan; the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Taiwan, which numbered about 8,500 by the early 1970s; the formal abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty; and a halt to U.S. arms supplies to Taiwan.

While American military strategists consistently regarded the U.S. defense of Taiwan as integral to the protection of American interests in south Asia, and while public opinion surveys consistently found that a substantial majority of Americans favored maintaining the U.S.-Taiwanese alliance, other considerations eventually began to erode America's commitment. Foremost among these was the foreign policy orientation of President Richard Nixon.

Although during his vice-presidential years Nixon had distinguished himself as an unbending opponent of Communist China and vociferous defender of Taiwan, the foreign policy theme of detente, which President Nixon shaped together with Henry Kissinger, called for accommodation of Communist regimes. The Vietnam debacle put additional pressure on Nixon to produce a foreign policy triumph that would shore up his domestic support. China, he decided, was the answer.

Within two weeks of his inauguration, in early 1969, Nixon arranged for secret contacts to be made, in Poland, with the Communist Chinese to help pave the way for a U.S.-Red China rapprochement. That fall, during the United Nations debate over admission of Communist China, there were further signs of a shift in American backing for Taiwan. Whereas previously the U.S. had unalterably opposed admitting the Red Chinese, it now changed to a position of opposing admission only if the expulsion of Taiwan *was* made a precondition for admission, as the Communists insisted. The American shift helped pave the way for the October 1971 expulsion of Taiwan and admission of Red China over nominal U.S. opposition.

In February 1972 Nixon made his historic visit to China. The Shanghai Communiqué issued jointly by Nixon and his Chinese counterparts at the conclusion of the visit, marked a sharp break with previous American policy. The statement began by asserting that the U.S. "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that

there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Technically the "one China" position could accurately refer to both the Red Chinese claim that they are the legitimate rulers of both the mainland and Taiwan, as well as Taiwan's official position that it is the legitimate ruler of the mainland. In practice, however, there was a vast difference between the two claims: whereas for the Taiwanese the concept of one China is a distant dream that they have never taken any steps to advance, for Communist China it is an active policy goal that it pursued during the 1950s by shelling Taiwan's offshore islands and which it would have pursued further if not for American intervention. (This difference between the theory and reality of the competing claims finds echoes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Israelis are aware that their Biblical and historical rights give them the superior right to considerably more territory than is presently in their possession, they have never made any attempt, except in absolute self-defense, to capture any of those areas. The Arabs, by contrast, have not merely dreamed of conquering all of Israel but have waged active warfare for nearly a century to attain that goal.)

From the practical point of view, the most significant aspect of the Shanghai Communiqué was Nixon's declaration that the U.S. "affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."¹⁴ During Nixon's term of office, and that of his successor, Gerald Ford, who followed Nixon's lead on China, American troop strength in Taiwan was reduced from 8,500 to just 1,400. A Republican president had fulfilled the first two conditions laid down by Red China for normalization of relations with the United States. A Democratic president would take the final step.

Jimmy Carter's plan to reverse American policy regarding Taiwan was not supported by domestic opinion, which polls showed to be consistently sympathetic to

Taiwan.¹⁵ Congressional sentiment was also consistently pro-Taiwan, as manifested in the Dole-Stone resolution of July 1978 (passed by the Senate by a vote of 94-0), which asked the administration to consult with Congress before changing U.S. policy towards China. Yet Carter believed, correctly, that support for Taiwan was wide but not deep; most Americans did not care enough about the issue to impede a presidential policy shift. Thus on December 15, 1978, Carter announced that he was scrapping the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (except for a limited number of defensive weapons) and extending full U.S. recognition to Red China. Shifting perceptions of U.S. strategic needs and the desire to impress domestic constituencies had prompted three American presidents, two Republicans and one Democrat, to reverse a commitment made to an American ally by their predecessors.

Israelis were shaken by Carter's shift on Taiwan. In a statement that was forceful despite the requirements of diplomatic protocol, the Israeli government declared: "Israel must give thorough consideration to the U.S. decision about Taiwan and reconsider Washington's ability to maintain its obligations under its agreements and treaties with other nations."¹⁶ Leading Congressional voices sympathized with Israel's concern. "Can we now fault Israel for its caution in accepting America's assurances regarding security?" asked Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah).¹⁷ Rep. Norman F. Lent (R-NY) agreed that Carter's decision "to abandon our staunch ally of thirty years" raises "a most disturbing question: Will Israel be abandoned just as casually?" Lent called on the Carter administration "to assure Israel and our other allies throughout the world that they will not be sold down the river through some new presidential move made in hope of improving the President's political image." Without such reassuring action, Lent warned, "Israel and all of our friends in the world will continue to feel the chill winds of doubt and uncertainty."¹⁸

U.S. GUARANTEES: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Egypt's military buildup during the early 1950s, combined with its sponsorship of incessant terrorist attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, brought tensions between the two countries to a violent climax in 1956. Determined to put an end to the terrorism, to deal a blow to the Egyptian military before its strength reached dangerous proportions, and to secure free passage for its ships through the Straits of Tiran --which the Egyptians were blocking-- the Israelis moved into Gaza and the Sinai peninsula in November 1956. President Eisenhower acknowledged that the Israeli action "resulted from grave and repeated provocations," but in an effort to bolster U.S. relations with the Arab world condemned Israel and demanded its immediate withdrawal from the captured territories.¹⁹

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was "profoundly" reluctant to accede to the U.S. demand. In a letter to Eisenhower, he outlined the security considerations that justified Israeli retention of the Gaza Strip, noting that as a result of Israel controlling the region, "the inhabitants of our villages in the South and the Negev could, for the first time in eight years, live in peace, knowing that grenades would not be thrown into their homes at night, and that they would not be ambushed on their way to work in the fields during the day."²⁰

Nevertheless, after three months of steadily intensifying U.S. pressure, Israel reluctantly agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Sinai--but only after receiving a written guarantee that the U.S. would take action to rectify any repeat of the provocations that had resulted in the Israeli military action. The guarantee, in the form of an Aide Memoire, was handed to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on February 11, 1957, by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. It promised that the U.S. would "use its best efforts to help assure" that a United Nations Emergency Force, placed in Gaza, would prevent that

region from continuing to serve as "a source of armed infiltration" of Israel. The document further guaranteed that the U.S. would "secure general recognition" of Israel's right to free passage through the Straits of Tiran.²¹ When Eban questioned Dulles about the "danger of precipitate withdrawal by the UN" in the event of some future crisis, Dulles "argued with emphatic conviction that nothing of the sort was conceivable," according to Eban's memoirs.²² Six years later, President John F. Kennedy strengthened the U.S. commitment to Israel, vowing that in the event of Arab aggression, the U.S. would not merely endorse steps taken by the United Nations in response, but would itself "adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression."²³ But Dulles's conviction and Kennedy's vow could not withstand the changes in political and military circumstances that lay ahead.

In the spring of 1967, Egypt began preparing for war. On May 17, Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force to vacate Gaza and Sinai. Within hours, the UN meekly complied, "destroying" --in Eban's words-- "in a single stroke, the most central hopes and expectations on which we had relied on withdrawing from Sinai in 1957." Egyptian troops began pouring into the Sinai. Israel warned that any attempt by the Egyptians to block the Straits of Tiran would be regarded as an act of war. Washington, for its part, remained neutral. Stung by the failure of U.S. allies to support American policy in Vietnam, the Johnson administration was not prepared to act unilaterally to stymie the Egyptian aggression. An official U.S. statement on May 22 declared that America would "support" UN action --not "adopt" action against Egypt on its own. The difference "between adopting courses oneself and supporting other measures is not trivial," Eban noted. "It is the distinction between responsible initiative and mere 'joining.'"²⁴

Even after the Egyptians blockaded the Straits of Tiran later that day, there would be neither "initiative" nor "joining"

by the United States. The Johnson administration urged Israel to postpone any military action, prompting the Israeli cabinet to send Eban (now Foreign Minister) to Washington to determine if the U.S. would take concrete steps to fulfill the 1957 guarantee. To Eban's "great alarm," he found Secretary of State Dean Rusk treating the crisis in a "leisurely" manner. What "depressed me most," Eban later recalled, was that instead of planning for U.S. action, Rusk was talking about seeking steps by the United Nations, which, in Eban's view, "conjured up nothing but a vista of delay and procrastination." And in the meantime, Egypt was readying for battle. Eban hurried to the Pentagon, only to discover that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Earl Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were not convinced that an Egyptian attack was imminent.

On the afternoon of May 26, Eban was finally granted an appointment with President Johnson. Armed with the minutes of the meetings between U.S. and Israeli officials in 1957, Eban insisted that there was "an explicit American commitment" to re-open the Straits, by force if necessary, and what he wanted to know now from Johnson was if the U.S. would "take a special initiative" to accomplish that aim. He was to be disappointed. Johnson said that he could do nothing until he was sure that his cabinet, Congress, and the American people would all support U.S. action. Even after that, the president said, "we have to go through the Secretary-General and the Security Council and build up support among the nations."²⁵ Johnson urged Israel to delay taking any steps. In the hope that the U.S. might succeed in organizing some sort of multinational force, the Israeli government agreed to wait.

Even after nine more days, however, nothing concrete had been attained. Various diplomatic contacts by the U.S. had accomplished little, and a letter from Johnson on June 4 reaffirmed that neither the U.S. nor its allies would take any action "until UN processes were exhausted."²⁶ Nasser was not willing to wait that long. On the morning of June 5,

advancing Egyptian planes were spotted by Israeli radar. The Israeli air force flew into action, and the Six Day War had begun. The Johnson administration did not want war to break out, nor did it want Israel to be harmed. But the military and political circumstances that prevailed when the Eisenhower administration offered its guarantee to Israel in 1957 were no longer relevant in 1967. A different perception of American interests had resulted in a different American policy.

Three years later, America's guarantees to Israel were again tested by Egyptian belligerency. Sporadic Egyptian assaults on Israel, beginning in late 1968, gradually escalated until, by mid-1969, a full-fledged War of Attrition was underway. Egyptian missile attacks and bombing raids launched from the western side of the Suez Canal were met in kind by the Israeli forces stationed on the eastern bank of the canal. A diplomatic initiative by the Nixon administration resulted in an August 7, 1970 ceasefire agreement according to which Egypt promised not to place any missiles within an area extending twenty miles westward from the canal. The agreement included American "assurances" to Israel "that the U.S. would use all its influence to maintain" the ceasefire."²⁷

Within days of the ceasefire, however, General Aharon Yariv, head of Israeli military intelligence, reported to the government that "the Egyptians had begun to move their missiles forward as soon as the ink was dry on the cease-fire agreement."²⁸ Hundreds of Sam-2 and Sam-3 surface-to-air missile batteries were rushed to the canal; the Egyptians, who had been unable to construct missile sites near the canal because of Israeli firepower, now did so under the cover of the ceasefire. Yet the Nixon administration, which had sponsored the ceasefire talks and pressured the Israelis to accept the terms of the agreement, was reluctant to acknowledge the Egyptian violations. After ten days of official U.S. silence, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird declared that it was "impossible to prove or disprove Israeli charges" about the missiles.²⁹ He said that the U.S. would undertake a

"study" of the Israeli allegation. America's "refusal to accept the inconvenient facts of the Egyptian breach of the standstill has undermined Israeli faith in American intentions more than any watering-down of earlier commitments or expressions of goodwill that could be interpreted as commitments," a Jerusalem Post editorial noted.³⁰

State Department officials whose sympathy for Israel had always been thin took advantage of the situation, responding to Israeli complaints with hostile leaks to the press. "Washington sources" told reporters that the Egyptian missiles may have been moved up, but "only in completion of movement started earlier--the Egyptians simply having 'missed the deadline'." All that really mattered, the "sources" insisted, was that with the ceasefire in place, Israel should agree to broader Arab-Israeli negotiations sponsored by U.N. Secretary-General Gunnar Jarring.³¹ The U.S. officials charged that Israel's complaint had become "a more central cause for the delay" in Jarring's mission, and berated Eban for engaging in "overkill" by publicly criticizing the Egyptian action.³² State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey asserted that the administration's "primary interest" was the Jarring talks, not the missile crisis, to which Israeli officials responded that if facilitating the talks "means overriding Israel's legitimate concerns, it will undermine Israeli confidence in American guarantees."³³

Finally, on August 19, the U.S. announced the completion of its "study." There had indeed been "forward deployment of missiles by the Egyptians around the time the cease-fire went into effect," the State Department announced, but the evidence that the movement continued after the deadline was "not conclusive." Rather than offer to take action against that portion of the "forward deployment" which it acknowledged, the U.S. offered a vague assurance that it "would not permit any developments to occur in the Suez Canal zone to shift the military balance against Israel."³⁴ Israel was outraged by the U.S. position. "I think that the

U.S., as the party that was a go-between and made all the arrangements, is duty-bound to see the situation is corrected," Prime Minister Golda Meir asserted.³⁵ She was hardly alone in that view. Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) called the U.S. position "a sell-out of Israel," and even the New York Times warned in an editorial that the episode "raises serious questions" about America's role in the Middle East negotiating process.³⁶ Despite Israeli protests, the missiles remained.³⁷ Three years later, when Egypt launched its Yom Kippur invasion of Israel, the proximity of those missiles to the Canal enabled the Egyptians to inflict severe casualties on Israel's frontline forces.

The problem was not that the U.S. had acted in bad faith, nor that it was indifferent to the threat posed to Israel by the Egyptian violations. The problem was that by injecting itself between the Arabs and the Israelis, the U.S. was soon compelled to balance conflicting global interests that quickly dragged it into a conflict with an ally. The administration's desire to help Israel was challenged by its desire to avoid a conflict with Egypt's Soviet sponsors. The dilemma inevitably led to tension between the U.S. and Israel and left the Jewish State in a weaker position.

Five years later, America made another commitment to Israel that circumstances would eventually challenge. As part of the deal offered by Henry Kissinger to persuade Israel to surrender strategic mountain passes and oil fields in the Sinai peninsula in 1975, the U.S. signed a joint Memorandum of Agreement with Israel pledging that the U.S. would "not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council resolutions 242 and 338." The Israelis understood this U.S. promise as a guarantee that they would not be pressured to accept the creation of a deadly PLO state on their doorstep. What the Israelis did not understand was that State Department officials had privately decided that the agreement "does not rule out

contacts that would be limited to trying to get fulfillment of the American conditions. Despite the danger that a PLO "fulfillment" obtained through American coaxing might not demonstrate a sincere change of heart by the terrorists, subsequent administrations opted to woo the PLO. Throughout 1977, the Carter administration used the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, as an intermediary to lure the PLO into saying the 'magic words.' The PLO refused--for the time being.³⁸

Efforts to romance the PLO continued under Carter's successors. In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig received authorization from President Ronald Reagan to woo the PLO. From August 1981 until May 1982, U.S. emissary John Mroz held more than 50 meetings (totaling over 400 hours) with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Despite Mroz's tireless efforts, Arafat would not budge. After Arafat and his forces were expelled from Lebanon in the autumn of 1982, the U.S. tried again. The new secretary of state, George Shultz, sent Mroz to PLO headquarters in Tunis on several occasions, but Arafat refused even to meet him, on the grounds that the U.S. had "collaborated" in Israel's strike against the PLO in Lebanon.³⁹

Shultz nevertheless decided, in March 1988, that a deal with the PLO would facilitate American attempts to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Secretary of State arranged a "precedent-shattering meeting" [as the *Jerusalem Post* called it⁴⁰] with Edward Said and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, two Arab-American professors who were members of the PLO's 'legislature', the Palestine National Council. The State Department defended the meeting by attempting to draw a distinction between the PNC and the PLO, although Said and Abu-Lughod, in their remarks to the media, described the PNC and PLO as being intimately related, and said that they had consulted with Yasser Arafat just prior to the meeting.⁴¹ According to the State Department, the Shultz meeting did not constitute a violation of America's 1975 promise regarding the

PLO, because "these two individuals came as American citizens, as prominent Americans who know something about the region, and who have some special insight, and with whom the Secretary had a useful discussion."⁴² PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif, by contrast, declared that the meeting was "important" precisely because Said and Abu-Lughod represented the PNC, which is "the highest legislative body of the PLO."⁴³

Whatever it was that Shultz offered the PNC men, or offered in subsequent, as yet unrevealed, contacts with other PLO representatives, he succeeded where earlier U.S. efforts had failed. At a press conference in Geneva on December 14, 1988, Arafat declared that he accepted U.N. resolution 242, asserted indirectly that he recognized Israel's right to exist, and renounced "all forms of terrorism." The Reagan administration immediately announced that it regarded the 1975 American promise to Israel as null and void. Formal U.S. negotiations with the PLO ensued, despite the fact that within days of the Geneva press conference, other PLO spokesmen, and even Arafat himself, made statements that contradicted the Geneva declaration.⁴⁴

If militant PLO statements did not shake the U.S. decision to deal with the PLO, neither did militant PLO actions. The U.S. had promised Israel that its dialogue with the PLO would be conditional upon all PLO factions refraining from terrorism, the PLO publicly dissociating itself from any acts of Palestinian Arab terrorism anywhere, and the expulsion from the PLO of any faction that attempted to carry out acts of terror. Yet each time PLO terrorists struck, State Department officials found a way to avoid acknowledging that PLO behavior contravened any of those three conditions. Some attacks were said to have targeted soldiers rather than civilians and therefore did not qualify as "terrorism." In other instances the attackers were said to have acted "without Arafat's authorization"--although that claim still did not excuse

Arafat's failure to condemn the deed and to expel the faction responsible. as the U.S. had promised.

A grim illustration of the Bush administration's approach was provided by the July 6, 1989, incident in which a Palestinian Arab terrorist steered an Israeli bus off a cliff, killing fourteen passengers. State Department officials called the attack "senseless" but at first refused to call it terrorism in what Israel said was an effort to justify Washington's continuing talks with the PLO." Not until five days after the attack—when another Arab terrorist group claimed responsibility for the deed-- did the State Department finally concede that it was indeed terrorism, but even then it insisted that the PLO had condemned the attack, which it had not.

Legislation passed by Congress in early 1990 forced the Bush administration to issue regular reports concerning PLO compliance with America's terms for the dialogue. The first report, issued on March 20, 1990, "reads more like a defense of the PLO than a balanced account of the PLO's record," noted Senator Connie Mack (R-Fla.). It acknowledged nine "cross-border attacks" by PLO factions since December 1988, dismissing six on the grounds that the "intended target of the attack was unclear," and the other three on the grounds that although the targets were civilian, the attacks were not authorized by Arafat. Steven Emerson, the award-winning investigative journalist, confronted the State Department over a January 26, 1990, incident in which three armed terrorists were captured near Israel's northern border with a map revealing their sole target was a kibbutz. A State Department spokesman said that since the attack and others like it did not succeed, 'we can't call them terrorist—we don't know what they were planning.'" Offered transcripts of the captured terrorists' confessions, the spokesman called the Israeli interrogators "unreliable." Asked if U.S. officials were interested in interviewing the terrorists, the spokesman declined.⁴⁵

MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION; THE CASE OF THE U.N. FORCES IN LEBANON

The military successes of the American-led multinational force that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait has generated talk of composing a similar force to be stationed as a buffer between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights, or as a deterrent to Arab terrorism, along the border between Israel and a Palestinian Arab entity. Israel's experience with such a multinational force in Lebanon, however, raises questions about the wisdom of such proposals.

In response to persistent cross-border attacks by Arab terrorism based in southern Lebanon, Israel launched a retaliatory incursion into the region in March 1978. After overrunning PLO bases and driving local terrorists out of the region, Israeli troops temporarily occupied a narrow strip of territory ranging from Israel's border to the Litani River, some six to ten miles to the north. The Carter administration coaxed the Israelis to pull out by initiating the creation of a new multinational force, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL. Its purpose was to protect Israel by keeping southern Lebanon clear of terrorists. Within days of UNIFIL's arrival in the region, Israel had reason to fear that it would not fulfill its mission.

In early April 1978, Israel withdrew from Kaukaba, a Lebanese village from which PLO terrorists had recently been ejected. The Norwegian contingent of UNIFIL occupied the town. Within three days, the PLO had reoccupied Kaukaba, and a UNIFIL commander was photographed giving a warm reception to his PLO counterpart.⁴⁶ In an editorial, the *Jerusalem Post* noted that the events in Kaukaba seemed to fulfill the dire predictions of those who had warned that a multinational force could not be trusted to protect Israel:

The U.N. forces, the critics predicted, would in no

way prevent the PLO from infiltrating the area again and from using it as a staging base for incursions into Israel, whereas Israeli preventive and punitive actions, whether by way of air strikes, artillery or land raids, would be inhibited by the fear of causing casualties to the U.N. forces.

Reports from some of the areas now being vacated by Israeli forces would seem to indicate that the criticism is to be vindicated...

The conclusion of the Post editorial contained a prescient warning: "If southern Lebanon is not maintained meticulously PLO-free, the last shred of credibility inherent in the American arguments of eventual Israeli withdrawal from the administered territories will be undermined."⁴⁷

By June 1978 --just two months after UNIFIL was initially deployed-- at least three hundred PLO terrorists had reoccupied UNIFIL-controlled areas of south Lebanon.⁴⁸ Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan complained that UNIFIL not only had permitted PLO terrorists to infiltrate southern Lebanon but was allowing PLO headquarters in northern Lebanon to supply the terrorist groups in the south. Dayan's charge was rebuffed by U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who said he saw nothing wrong with UNIFIL permitting the delivery of "supplies" to "limited Palestinian groups still in its area of operations."⁴⁹ By July, reports from the region revealed that some UNIFIL units had reached informal deals with the PLO according to which PLO gangs were allowed to gradually infiltrate the south so long as they refrained from attacking UNIFIL outposts.⁵⁰

Several years later, Israeli troops who captured a PLO bunker in southern Lebanon discovered a written agreement between the commander of the Norwegian UNIFIL unit and the PLO that promised non-interference by the Norwegians in any terrorist activity that took place in their zone.⁵¹ Other captured PLO documents included PLO intelligence reports

that quoted UNIFIL sources for estimates of Israeli troop strengths and movements--evidence "that high-ranking UNIFIL officers have been passing intelligence information on the Israeli Army to the PLO," according to the chief of staff of the Israeli Army.⁵²

The UNIFIL forces made little effort to hide their bias. They stationed themselves along the edges of areas controlled by Israel's allies, the Lebanese Christians, and faced south toward the Christians, rather than north toward the part of the country from which PLO terrorists were coming.⁵³ Those units known for their military prowess, such as the French and the Irish, were positioned around the Christian enclaves, while contingents that had little or no military experience, such as those from Fiji and Senegal, were deployed in spots where the PLO ruled.⁵⁴ But it was more than a matter of careless deployment; there was evidence of genuine fraternization between UNIFIL and the PLO. Lebanese villagers who were interviewed by Israeli journalists (at the "Good Fence" crossing, at the Israel-Lebanon border) described seeing UNIFIL soldiers and PLO terrorists socializing together and, in some cases, living side by side.⁵⁵ UNIFIL men were spotted taking part in a funeral and rally held in the town of Tir Zibna in honor of a terrorist who had been killed nearby.⁵⁶ In another case, Nepalese UNIFIL soldiers posed for souvenir photographs with a Hezbollah terrorist.⁵⁷

It was not long before episodes of direct collaboration began to emerge. More than forty members of the Iranian UNIFIL contingent deserted their unit to join the terrorists.⁵⁸ An officer from the Senegalese unit was caught attempting to smuggle a large quantity of explosives from Lebanon to PLO cells in Israel, and a senior UNIFIL officer from Nigeria was arrested near Jerusalem with two suitcases full of explosives, detonators, machine-guns and ammunition that he was going to deliver to a PLO gang.⁵⁹ In other incidents, a French UNIFIL officer and a Swedish UNIFIL soldier were arrested (by the Lebanese Christian forces) for photographing Israeli

military installations,(60) and a captured PLO terrorist revealed that the PLO had purchased missiles from the Irish unit, and had paid \$25,000 to a senior Irish UNIFIL officer to provide photographs and data concerning Israeli military positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.⁶¹ Israeli Army officials, commenting on the latter episode, confirmed that the PLO often bribed UNIFIL men for such purposes⁶² As the Jerusalem Post noted, the fact that the gun-smuggling activities of the UNIFIL men "came to light by chance would seem to indicate that many other UNIFIL arms smugglers have actually delivered the murderous goods entrusted to their hands to terrorist contacts on the West Bank and in Jerusalem.⁶³

The most striking fact to emerge about the activity of UNIFIL was that instead of fulfilling its ostensible purpose -the protection of northern Israel from the sort of terrorist attacks that had provoked Israel's 1978 retaliatory strike in the first place-- it did precisely the opposite. Within six months of UNIFIL's arrival, more than 700 PLO terrorists had returned to the area under its Jurisdiction and established 42 bases there.⁶⁴ (The UNIFIL's own estimates, of "only" 350 terrorists and 15 bases, were hardly comforting.⁶⁵

To make matters worse, if Israel sent its troops into southern Lebanon to strike at the terrorists. they risked clashing with UNTIL and setting off a torrent of international criticism. After several such clashes, the Israeli government felt it had no choice but to tie its soldiers' hands; it issued guidelines instructing soldiers that 'it is preferable not to open fire at all, even at hostile forces, if such fire could endanger UNIFIL personnel.⁶⁶

The PLO exploited Israel's sensitivity to world opinion by using UNIFIL as a shield against Israeli retribution. If Israeli targets were within firing range the PLO men fired from within UNIFIL territory.⁶⁷ If it was necessary to reach the Israeli border to find suitable targets, the terrorists were careful to cross through UNIFIL areas on the way to and from

Israel. Thus two PLO terrorists who were caught as they were about to carry out “an indiscriminate massacre” in the Israeli moshav of Zarit revealed that their orders (from Yasser Arafat's deputy, Abu Jihad) were to return after the killings to the region supervised by the Dutch UNIFIL brigade and surrender themselves there: the Dutch could be counted on to take their weapons, hand over the terrorists to the neighborhood PLO liaison officer, and then return the weapons a few days later.⁽⁶⁸⁾ There have also been cases in which PLO terrorists fleeing Lebanese Christian militiamen actually took refuge in UNIFIL outposts.⁶⁴ In other instances, UNIFIL men have preferred to turn a blind eye when terrorists plant mines on roads near their outposts, according to the head of the Israeli Army's northern command.⁷⁰

UNIFIL units have sometimes even directly interfered in attempts by the Israeli Army to strike at, or capture PLO terrorists in southern Lebanon. In May 1979, an Israeli patrol spotted a terrorist gang approaching a kibbutz near the border. There was an exchange of fire, and several of the terrorists escaped northwards, their tracks leading to an area under the control of the Irish UNIFIL brigade. When the Israeli troops approached, UNIFIL officers ordered them to withdraw or be shot at, and reinforcements from the Dutch, Nigerian and Senegalese units were rushed to the scene. The Israelis retreated, and the terrorists returned safely to their bases.⁷¹ In 1981, an Israeli Army unit pursuing terrorists in the Lebanese town of Ras Bayadda, near the area of the Dutch UNIFIL battalion, was fired upon by the Dutch soldiers, while Israeli soldiers chasing terrorists through the village of Shuba were blocked by a Norwegian unit that opened fire to force them to withdraw.⁷²

The following year, the Norwegians did it again: an Israeli force pursuing PLO mine-planters near the Syrian border tracked them to a site in the Norwegian zone, only to be subjected to a barrage of bazooka and small arms fire by the Norwegians.⁷³ Then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin

testified before a Knesset committee in 1985 that French UNIFIL soldiers had engaged in "particularly abominable" behavior by deliberately interfering with Israeli anti-terrorist operations.⁷⁴ The Dutch, for their part, in one case planted obstacles in the path of an advancing Israeli tank column (damaging one tank), while an Irish outpost turned off its night spotlight to help a gang of terrorists evade their Israeli pursuers.⁷⁵

The recent proliferation of Moslem fundamentalist Hezbollah terrorists in southern Lebanon has not changed UNIFIL's pattern of behavior. When the Israeli Army launched a major counter-terror strike against Hezbollah positions in February, 1992 (in response to incessant Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel), UNIFIL units actively interfered. As the first Israeli armored columns made their way into the region, a Nepalese unit blocked the roads to prevent the Israeli advance. The subsequent clashes between the Israelis and the UNIFIL brigades alerted the local terrorists, thereby robbing the Israelis of the element of surprise. While undertaking the time-consuming process of detouring around the UNIFIL roadblocks, the Israelis were ambushed by Hezbollah terrorists who killed two Israeli soldiers.⁷⁶

If UNIFIL's record in Lebanon may be regarded as the archetype of multinational forces' ability to protect Israel, one must wonder if a comparable multinational force could be relied upon to guard Israel from PLO terrorists stationed in a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Certainly the conditions along Israel's eastern front make it unlikely that an international force could ensure Israel's safety. Unlike southern Lebanon, Judea-Samaria and Gaza straddle Israel's major population centers, thereby making the Israeli civilian population an easy target for terrorist attacks. The availability of sophisticated shoulder-launched missiles makes the proximity of large Israeli cities to the borders of such a Palestinian state all the more frightening. Even with the best

of intentions, a multinational force would be saddled with a task far too burdensome to fulfill. The fact that it would likely be under United Nations authority means that the large Arab-Third World voting bloc at the U.N. would have a say in what the multinational forces would be permitted to do. Since the Arabs and their allies would regard PLO terrorist attacks as "legitimate resistance" or "freedom fighting," they would surely seek to limit the ability of a multinational force to combat PLO terror gangs.

WHO SHOULD GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SAFETY?

Every new president has his own particular perception of America's foreign policy interests. Alliances that seemed vital to one president may be regarded by his successor as irrelevant. An interventionist president may be followed by an isolationist, who in turn may be followed by another interventionist. There are no eternal principles; there are only ever-changing perceptions of what is in the U.S. interest. "Guaranteeing" Israel's security may impress one president as being in the American interest, while his successor may adopt an entirely different perspective. The problem is not that a new president would harbor anti-Israel bias but simply that his calculation of what is best for U.S. foreign policy may conflict with the promises that his predecessors made. That is what happened in regard to Vietnam and Taiwan. That is also what happened to America's promises to keep open the Straits of Tiran (1957), to prevent Egyptian missiles from being stationed near the Suez Canal (1970), and to refrain from recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (1975). In each case, a president's new understanding of U.S. interests clashed with the attitudes that had led a predecessor to make commitments to the Jewish State. Congressional and public opinion, while generally sympathetic to Israel, did not alter the course of events.

Pressing Israel into territorial vulnerability and reliance on American or multinational forces would therefore seem to be the wrong course for U.S. foreign policy. It would place a strategically valuable ally at the mercy of domestic U.S. political and social circumstances, the shifting tides of American public opinion, and, in the case of a multinational force, the conflicting (and possibly anti-Israel) agendas of the sponsoring governments. The America-Israel alliance is best served by ensuring that Israel has the territory and military wherewithal to defend itself, not by weakening Israel and forcing it into a dependency relationship which ultimately will serve neither American nor Israeli interests.

"A security guarantee is no substitute for defensive strength," Abba Eban remarked in 1956.⁷⁷ Israel's experiences with foreign guarantees since 1956 have demonstrated that Eban's words are even truer today than when they were first spoken.

¹ Jerusalem Post [hereafter JP], June 16, 1993.

² Hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1, 1993.

³ JP, June 11, 1993.

⁴ "Document: The Pentagon Plan," reprinted in Michael Widlanski et al, Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1989).

⁵ George McTurnan Kahin and John Wilson Lewis, eds. The United States in Vietnam (New York: Dial Press, 1967). SEATO was also signed by the Philippines, Pakistan, England, France, Australia, and New Zealand, but it was initiated by the U.S. and in the end only the U.S. acted upon it.

⁶ New York Times [hereafter NYT], August 5, 1964; Department of State Bulletin (Washington, August 24, 1964); Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p.48; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p.542.

- ⁷ Johnson, The Vantage Point, p.54; Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p.261.
- ⁸ Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.718.
- ⁹ Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p.1462.
- ¹⁰ Nixon, RN, p.888.
- ¹¹ John Tierney, Jr., ed. About Face: The China Decision and Its Consequences (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1979), p.18.
- ¹² Tierney, About Face, p.16.
- ¹³ Tierney, About Face, p.339.
p.266
- ¹⁵ Michael Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, eds., Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations: Past and Future (New York: Basic Books, 1978),
- ¹⁵ A Harris poll in September 1978 found 64% of Americans opposed to abandonment of Taiwan, 19% in favor (Tierney, About Face, p.327).
- ¹⁶ Tierney, About Face, p.425.
- ¹⁷ Tierney, About Face, p.22.
- ¹⁸ Congressional Record, January 18, 1979.
- ¹⁹ 'Address by President Eisenhower on the Situation in the Middle East, February 20, 1957,' Department of State Bulletin 387-91 (March 11, 1957).
- ²⁰ Ben-Gurion to Eisenhower, March 8, 1957, in Meron Medzini, ed. Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974 (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1976), p.625.
- ²¹ "Aide Memoire Handed to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on February 11, 1957, by Secretary of State Dulles," Department of State Bulletin 392-93 (March 11, 1957).
- ²² Abba Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography (London: Futura, 1979 ed.), p.321.
- ²³ JP, May 24, 1967.
- ²⁴ Eban, Abba Eban pp.328-329.
- ²⁵ Eban, Abba Eban, pp.355-358.
- ²⁶ Eban, Abba Eban, p.397.
- ²⁷ JP, August 18, 1970.
- ²⁸ Eban, Abba Eban, p.469.
- JP, August 17, 1970.
- ³⁰ JP, August 18, 1970.
- ³¹ JP, August 18, 1970.
- ³² NYT, August 19, 1970

- 33 NYT, August 18, 1970.
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- 37 Bernard Reich, quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), pp.168-174.
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- 55 JP, June 20, 1978 and July 16, 1978.
- 56 JP, August 20, 1979.
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- 58 JP, February 20, 1979.
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- 64 JP, December 25, 1978
and October 15, 1984.
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JP, March 22, 1989.
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- 70 JP, January 29, 1990
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- 71 JP, May 10, 1979.
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- 74 Hadashot, Feb. 27, 1985.
- 75 JP, March 21, 1980,
June 16, 1982, March 13,
1988, and Apr. 30, 1979.
- 76 JP, February 25, 1992
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- 77 JP, February 20, 1956.

